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The sub jec t  of this conference makes me t h ink  back 
t o  a luncheon i n  Gatlinburg, Tennessee, i n  May of 1961 
a t  which I a l s o  was the gues t  speaker. A t  tha t  time we 
were awaiting Shepard's suborb i ta l  f l i g h t .  The Russians 
had launched seve ra l  very high payload satell i tes weighing 
about 10,000 t o  14,000 pounds. I n  April  of 1961, Gagarin 
had made the first manned o r b i t a l  f l igh t .  
NASA and, I am sure  i n  the e n t i r e  aerospace community and 
Many of us i n  





policy decision from the President on space program objectives. In my 
Gatlinburg speech I tried to anticipate the goals that the President 
might set in our space program and I tried to consider the alternatives 
that were available. My conviction was then, and still is today, that 
space represents an area of visible technological and scientific strength 
in which the United States must demonstrate superiority. In currently 
used terminology we must demonstrate preeminence in space. 
In my Gatlinburg talk I referred to a speech that the President 
had made before the newspaper publishers in New York the previous 
week. He was talking about the challenge to our way of life when he 
said, "whatever our hopes may be for the future . . . . . for reducing 
this threat or  living with it . . . . . there is no escaping either the 
gravity or the totality of its challenge to our security and survival . . . . . 
a challenge that confronts us in unaccustomed ways in every sphere of 
human activities. 
think the basic premise in that quotation is still correct and I am 
convinced that space represents one of the many areas in which we 
must meet the challenge and achieve demonstrable preeminence. 
Although details may have changed since then, I 
In was true two years ago and I believe it is still true that none 
of us in the space business and none of the people in this country could 
o r  would tolerate a situation in which we would indefinitely and possibly 
forever be watching someone else perform the dramatic missions in 
space, making the dramatic discoveries in space, while we tagged 
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along indicating either that we don't think it's important enough to drive 
into space, o r  else, after much delay, we would come along to duplicate 
the mission and say, "See, we can do it too. I t  I don't think any of us 
would have tolerated the situation which existed two years ago when 
the Russians were repeatedly launching heavy payloads (and they still 
are),. and when the Russians had already launched the first man in space 
if we could not look forward to the time that we could ourselves have 
established superiority o r  preeminence. A country that is always second 
best in so obvious 'an area of scientific and technological achievement 
would certainly suffer a serious loss in morale, leadership, strength, 
and respect. I don't think we have ever had any choice but to accept the 
challenge and make the effort necessary to assure obvious preeminence. 
Accepting this premise, I presented two possible mission goals 
in my Gatlinburg talk: one was manned landing and exploration of the 
moon; the other was manned landing and exploration of Mars. I 
indicated my personal preference for aiming at the Mars mission because 
it would be further off in time and with what I believe to be a lead in 
nuclear rocket propulsion, would give us a greater chance of taking a 
clear lead in space. Another reason for my thinking was that develop- 
ing the capability to do the M a r s  mission would automatically develop a 
capability to do the lunar-mission, so we could do that as a logical 
part of an effort aimed at the planets. 
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The President's address to Congress on national goals came a 
little over two weeks later. In that address the President specified the 
manned lunar landing mission in this decade as our major space 
objective. He also included as one of four major items emphasis on 
the ROVER nuclear rocket program because it offered a capability for 
missions beyond the moon. 
I believe that the speed with which the lunar mission program 
has been undertaken, the major decisions that have been made in 
regard to the mode of operation and the vehicles to be used, the 
selection of launch site and test and fabrication facilities, the selection 
of development contractors, and the establishment of a total 
organization for executing the program give us good reason to hope 
that we wi l l  be first in the landing of men on the moon, within this 
decade. In essence, there is a strong belief, and I agree, that the 
manned lunar program is sufficiently far off, it has been started rapidly 
enmgh, and the technology is well enough developed to give us 
reasonable assurance that we can demonstrate our superiority in space 
through the accomplishment of this mission within this decade. 
It is important, however, as is being done at this conference, 
for all of us to think ahead to the next possible steps in space. We 
have in the past misjudged most areas of new technological development 
and we have frequently underestimated the progress in those areas. 
We must accept as inevitable the fact that we now stand near the' 
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center of a fairly small circle of knowiedge on space and that, as we 
explore out to its circumference, we will find more and more things to 
learn and do as part of a circle of evei increasing radius. It is 
important that we have some feel for the missions that are logical 
follow-on to the manned lunar landing mission so that we may prepare 
the basic information, the understanaing, the technology, and the 
hardware that will eventually be required to perform these advanced 
missions in a reasonable time without the need for excessive crash 
efforts. We must never permit outselves t,o come up against the stone 
wall of inadequate research information that prevents our taking the 
l q i c a l  next step aimed at continued learning and continued progress. 
It is, therefore, necessary that we look tc the evaluation of advanced 
missions in order to determine the kind of hardware, the kind of 
technology, and the kind of research that is required to  answer the 
unknowns. 
The accomplishment of missions to Mars will require the 
development of new propulsion systems, new rockets, new spacecraft, 
and new technology in all these areas. It will require an understanding 
of space shielding, meteoroid protecticn, propellant storage, guidance 
and control, better information on the planet, and development of the 
launch complexes, etc'. It will be a very major undertaking exceeding 
the Apollo program in total cost and difficulty. For that reason, we 
must realistically recognize that one of the factors determining the 
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timing of such a mission will be the availability of funds and manpower. 
We  must recognize that we cannot undertake such a mission until the 
Apollo mission begins to phase out. 
If, as will probably be the case, rendezvous in earth orbit and 
some orbital assembly or propellant transfer will be required to perform 
the Mars landing missions, an earth orbiting space laboratory will 
probably precede the accomplishment of the actual planetary missions. 
The cost of such a system would also be high but it would probably be a 
necessary stepping stone to the planetary missions. Therefore, i f  we 
direct our long range attention to the performance of the manned Mars 
mission, we will be providing the capability for many other missions of 
inter est. 
I am not convinced, however, that funding will itself set the 
pace of a Mars mission because the unknowns in such a mission will 
require the accumulation of a great deal of basic information and it will 
require substantial development efforts for all of the systems and 
facilities that would be required in such a mission. I think it is to be 
expected that the time required for development of these systems puts 
the accomplishment of a manned Mars landing mission off until late in 
the seventies and more plrobably into the early eighties. This may 
come as a shock to many of the so-called planners whose reports 
talk of what would be required to do a manned planetary mission in 
1971 to 1973. I think that in their hope to sell the mission they are 
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completely fooling themselves as to the complexity and difficulty of the 
overall mission. Unfortunately there are many people within the 
Government who propose that contractors aim their work at evaluating 
what would be required in the way of development efforts and develop- 
ment programs to achieve major portions of planetary mission systems 
in the early seventies. As is always the case, we would be much wiser 
and surer of accomplishing such a mission at the earliest possible time 
if we realistically recognize the difficulty of the job and proceed 
aggressively &d logically to accumulate the technology in all of the 
areas of uncertainties in the development of the systems needed to 
perform such a mission so  that we can better plan and program the 
mission. 
How will the planetary mission be accomplished? Considering 
only the propulsion part of the system, I am convinced that nuclear 
propulsion will be used in the upper stages. More specifically, I 
expect that large chemical rocket booster stages, in combination with 
nuclear rocket upper stages, will be used to accomplish the Mars 
landing mission. I expect also that such vehicles and propulsion 
systems will be used to  perform the preliminary missions of manned 
fly-by trips around Mars and trips into orbit around Mars. It is 
conceivable that such missions could start in the latter part of the 
'IO'S. I am sure that talks given in this conference have already 
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presented, o r  will present the advantages of nuclear rockets for such 
missions, or they have tacitly assumed their use. 
I would like to take the rest of the time available to me to 
consider some of the propulsion systems that are being considered 
for  Mars missions and that have been suggested for M a r s  missions. 
Rather than going into specific descriptions of the work going on, I 
would like to generally present my thoughts on these various propulsion 
systems. 
The propdsion systems that are now available to us a re  
essentially the low specific impulse chemical rocket systems, relying 
upon various solid propellants and upon the use of kerosene and oxygen. 
As a logical step, following extensive research effort within the 
Government and in some industrial groups, considerable effort is now 
being directed toward developing chemical rocket systems using 
hydrogen-oxygen as the propellant combination. It is my personal 
opinion, not supported by any agency approval o r  planning, that 
hydrogen-oxygen will be used in the launch stages of the large vehicles 
needed to place about a million pounds into earth orbit preparatory to 
rendezvous, assembly, and propellant transfer for the nuclear rocket 
propelled Mars trip. It is interesting to point out that the development 
and mission application _and our major dependence upon successful 
development of hydrogen-oxygen in Centaur, Saturn I, Saturn IB, 
and Saturn V was initiated on the basis of the research work and ground 
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test work that had been done. There is today no flight experience with 
this propellant combination. There is, however, very suc-cessful 
ground test operation of engines using hydrogen-oxygen as the propellant 
combination. I emphasize this point because it indicates that where 
the new system is a logical follow-on to existing information and offers 
significant performance advantages, developments are undertaken 
without the need for flight demonstration. What is needed, however, is 
sGbstantia1 research effort and ground test experience to assure that 
the technology is understood and that hardware can be developed. 
I maintain that the nuclear rocket is the next logical step in 
rocket propulsion. The turbopumps, nozzles, gimbal bearings, thrust 
structure, valving, vehicle structure, guidance systems, are all logical 
follow-on developments based to a very large extent on technology 
available in chemical rocket practice. In addition, the methods of 
developing these components and systems rely heavily on techniques 
developed in chemical rocket practice. What is new in these "con- 
nuclear" components is the radiation environment and, in certain 
cases, an extrapolation to higher heat fluxes o r  flow capacity. This 
does not, in my opinion, involve the development of new teehnologjj. 
It does involve extending the knowledge provided for sirnilar components 
in the chemical rocket system into new ranges of operzting conditions. 
This may, of course, involve new fabrication techniqiles, different 
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materials, elimination of radiation sensitive equipment and materials, 
but is still not new in terms of requiring an entirely new technology. 
, 
The major new item in the nuclear rocket is of course the 
nuclear reactor. I am confident that. such a reactor can be developed 
and that it will result from the program we are pursuing. We a r e  
aiming our program at providing this  new reactor technology and at 
defining, through a careful research and technology development effort, 
the boundary conditions within which we can design and operate these 
reactors, so  that they may, with confidence, be planned for in 
application to  various space missions. I am convinced that as soon as 
successful reactor operation has been achieved, the practicability, 
developability and performance potential of nuclear rockets will be 
cj-enerally accepted and will be relied upon in all new vehicle develop- 
ments and in extending the payload capability of the Saturn V vehicle. 
An important question to explore then is, what is the current 
status of the reactor part of the program? I do not mean by this to 
minimize the problems that will undoubtedly be faced in the develop- 
ment of other components of the system, but I believe that the crucial 
pacing and determining part of the nuclear rocket will be the 
achievement of successful reactor operation. 
The first nuclear-rocket reactors have been undergoing tests 
in the KIWI program. Thus far, six KIWI reactor tests have been run 
at nuclear power. The first three of these were part of the KIWI-A 
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series, and the last three were part of the KIWI-B program aimed at 
developing a basic core design that could be engineered for flight 
application. The last two power experiments were-run using liquid 
hydrogen as the coolant with a regenerative, liquid hydrogen cooled 
jet nozzle. Important results were obtained in these tests to indicate 
that the method of reflector drum control is an effective one and that 
the reactor can be started in a controlled manner with liquid hydrogen. 
Other general results on the neutronics, materials, design assumptions, 
etc. were obtained. However, reactor damage has been encountered. 
In the last power test run on November 30 of last year, the KIWI-B4A 
reactor, which has been and is our favored basic design for flight 
development, encountered vibrations early in the test run. Examination 
of the reactor indicated cracking in almost all of the fuel elements and 
damage to certain thermal insulation components surrounding t5e cope. 
You may ask how I can be s o  confident of developing a suitable 
nuclear rocket technology in the face of this damage that has shown up 
in the development of the nuclear rocket reactor. I arn convinced 
that these troubles are in the area of mechanical engineering design. 
Their solution is susceptible to the normal engineering development 
processes used on any mechanical system. The fact that neutrons 
exist provides simply another design environmental condition but does 
not make the  actor a magical black box to be handled as something 
different from any other mechanical system. 
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I am convinced that one of the major problems in our program 
to date has been insufficient analysis and testing of all of the components 
and subsystems under conditions that simulate as closely as possible 
the conditions that will exist in the reactor. It is, of course, true that 
it is difficult to  simultaneously duplicate all conditions. However, I 
believe the preparation of appropriate test equipment and simulation 
facilities, even i f  complex and costly, is justified by the increased 
probability of successful development of this important technology. 
Where simultaneous simulation of environmental conditions is not 
possible, then preliminary testing under partial environmental 
conditions is better than none at all, if a suitable analytical model is 
developed and used to evaluate the results obtained. When we consider 
the hundreds of millions of dollars in environmental simulation and test 
facilities that have been spent in the aircraft and space area so far for 
wind tunnels, vacuum chambers, centrifuges, dynamic stands, space 
simulators, and component facilities, we realize that this is not a new 
concept. 
At the very start of the nuclear rocket program, however, it 
was decided that full reactor tests were the best way of simulating all 
effects that would be experienced in the reactor. The program 
emphasized this point to the extent that, I believe, the pressure of 
full power tests and of meeting tight, self-imposed schedules fo r  
such tests resulted in bypassing important preliminary development 
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steps and resulted in insJfficient thought on tne development of means 
of testing all of the parts of the systems under simulated conditions. 
This point is obviously made in retrospect, but it serves as a basic 
guide in our program now. 
I think a good indication of this fact is demonstrated by the 
results of our recent tests on a cold reactor having no uranium at all, 
which was run to help eqlain the results in our November power tests. 
In this reactor, the fuel elements were replaced by unloaded graphite. 
The tests were run with nitrogen, helium, and hydrogen gas flows 
with pressure drops through the reactor similar t o  those that exist 
during a normal reactor startup. Vibrations were encountered during 
those tests similar to the ones that were experienced in the Fower run 
m the KIWI-B4A reactor made last November. Considering the 
difference in cost of materials (no uranium and far cheaper fuel 
element costs) and labor and time, we estim-ate the tests of May 15 
were probably on the order of $2 million cheaper than the pcwer run 
on the KIWI-B4A. I also believe much more information w a s  obtained 
during that test than during the KIWI-B4A test of last November. I 
think this is a good indication that partial simulation is better than 
none and in a development program where understanding must be an 
esserrtial goal, it may, at certain times, be better than the full 
power operation. 
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The present program is being expanded to include all of the 
detailed, simulated, component and subassembly flow and mechanical 
tests that are required in the development of any piece of mechanical 
equipment. In addition, full reactor tests under cold gas conditions 
and cold liquid and vibration tests will be included. All of these tests 
may provide a veto on the running of any power reactor test, but power 
tests are obviously an essential part  of any program as a demonstration 
of successful operation and as a means of duplicating all ground 
operating conditions of the system simultaneously. I am convinced 
that such a thorough development approach will lead to successful 
reactor operations. 
It must, however, be recognized that, as is the case in every 
development program, no individual reactor test should be expected 
to  prove itself completely satisfactory until we have passed quite a 
large number of tests. Problems may reveal themselves in the 
component test and simulated environment test effort. Problems may 
be revealed in the next power tests. All of these will result in changes 
in design aimed at solving the problems that are revealed. This is 
the normal course of events in a development program and should 
not be considered unusual in this  case. 
When sufficient confidence exists that the reactor is well along 
in development toward the achievement of a satisfactory design, then 
the major hardware development on the NERVA engine md the RIFT 
15 
stage will proceed. I have no question that every other component 
required in the engine system can be developed. I have further been 
assured by all of our vehicle people that the RIFT vehicle is much 
simpler than any other rocket vehicle so that technology certainly will 
not be the pacing element. 
In the course of development of the nuclear rocket I hear some, 
who generally have other systems to sell, predict the failure of the 
systems with which we are working. They question fuel elements, 
strength, life, corrosion, structure - anything that will make the as 
yet totally unevaluated paper designsound better than the one that is 
under development. The desire to sell frequently results in a paper 
design based on a trivial and inadequate amount of research information 
that has every virtue one can quote. It recalls words attributed to 
Admiral Rickover sometime back. He is quoted as having said 
' I . .  . . . the academic reactors have none of the performance failures 
o r  faults of the real ones . . . . . " In most cases, unfortunately, these 
salesmen of paper designs try to sell a system development rather 
than a logical program of accumulation of the information upon which 
any rational design and development must be based. 
However, this does not absolve us of our responsibility to 
undertake promising backup reactor work in a program of such size 
and importance. For that reason, we are conducting work aimed at 
accumulating such basic information with tungsten and we a r e  also 
undertaking conceptual design studies of various alternate graphite 
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reactors. These systems are, however, several years behind the 
graphite system on which we a re  now working. It will probably take 
two years of good solid work before we a re  ready to undertake a full- 
fledged reactor development based on tungsten technology. It would 
probably be at least four years or more likely five years before'a 
tungsten reactor power test could be run. 
In general, I am convinced that we can make the nuclear rocket 
technology available for use in a wide variety of missions. Nuclear 
rockets are behg thoroughly investigated and researched. They are 
the next logical, large step jump in specific impulse. I am convinced 
that we will rely on them in all of the missions that we perform beyond 
those that a re  now programmed. 
We should also consider where electric propulsion, Orion, and 
the gaseous reactor rocket systems may be used. I would like to spend 
a little time discussing these systems. It is obviously important for 
this country to carefully consider and evaluate the different systems 
that are proposed in order to t ry  to assure that it is working on systems 
that will prove feasible, useable, and developable, and will have 
sufficient performance potential to make them interesting. 
On paper, all three of these advanced systems offer substantial 
performance potential .- If electric power generating systems weighing 
in the neighborhood of 10 pounds per kilowatt can be developed to 
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operate fo r  over a year with good reliability, then electric propulsion 
might compete with the nuclear rocket for the manned Mars  mission.. 
Electric powers of 20 to  40 megawatts would be required for such a 
mission. With men on board, some maintenance on the power supply 
might be possible, thereby helping to ease a bit the extreme performance 
d d  life requirements imposed on unmanned electrically propelled 
systems. It must, nevertheless, be recognized that the development 
of systems weighing 10 pounds per kilowatt and capable of delivering 
20 to 40 megawatts electrical for very long periods may not be 
achievable. 
program is now under way to t ry  to accumulate the information 
necessary to determine the feasibility of the performance objectives 
I have just listed. I believe that the data obtained so far, although 
very meager, combined with the performance potential of electric 
propulsion for missions beyond Mars, including difficult instrumented 
missions to the more distant planets, and the need for large amounts 
of on-board, auxiliary electric power justify the technology 
development effort that is under way. 
A strong research and advanced technology development 
Another system that is being strongly boosted for missions to 
the planets and into deep space o r  for missions involving large 
velocity increments due to maneuverability requirements, is the 
Orion concept. You will recall that this is the concept in which a 
succession of many, small nuclear explosions a re  used to propel a 
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large spaceship. I used the word llshipll rather than 'Icraft'l because 
the protagonists for this system talk in terms of heavy ship building 
construction and assembly methods. There is naturally much 
enthusiasm about the performance potential that has been calculated 
for this system. It is however, uncertain as to how close to this 
performance poteEtial one can really get. It is my personal opinion 
that nuclear tests a r e  essential if  any meaningful results a r e  to be 
obtained to answer any questions on actual performance potential and 
feasibility. Although these would start as single nuclear shots, they 
wotild very quickly have to expand to many tests in rapid succession 
and would probably have to be done in space to be meaningful. Herein 
l ies the problem as I see it. A s  I have indicated earlier, it is my' 
opinion thzt i f  a system is to be relied upon and is to be successfully 
developed, it must be possible to break the system down into com- 
ponents that may then be evaluated under environmental conditions 
simulating in essential parts the environmental conditions that it will 
see  in the flight system. These compcnents must then be put together 
in subassemblies anc! thoroughly tested, analyzed, and evaluated. 
Finally, they must be assembled into the system and thoroughly tested 
on the ground. It is, in my opinion, essential that a system be able 
to go through such a ground development program i f  it is to be a 
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feasible system. I do not believe that Orion is such a system. I have 
seen no such test o r  development program plan. I have seen no plan 
for the development of simulation facilities in which to test components, 
subassemblies, and assemblies under the space flight environmental 
conditions. It is always proposed that the system will be developed in 
flight. I think this is nonsense. It requires that the country make the 
commitment of all of the funds required before it has ever demonstrated 
what the system can do or  that it can do anything. I h o w  of no system 
that has been developed in flight and I am personally convinced there 
will never be such a system development. Flight tests are,  of course, 
used in development as a check to insure that the space flight environ- 
ment does not adversely affect the already determined performance of 
the system. In some cases, as, for example, the Saturn I first stage, 
the flight tests become a demonstration of the suitability of the system. 
I believe that every effort must be made to make the flight test a 
demonstration of suitable operation. If suitable ground tests cannot 
be prepared, if ground test facilities cannot be prepared, then, in my 
opinion, the system is not developable. I have come to the conclusion, 
after much though on Orion, that with all of its calculated performance 
potential, it is not feasible because it is not developable. Developa- 
bility is as important in judging feasibility as is the need for 
assurance that a concept does not violate any basic physical principles. 
. .  
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In the gaseous and cavity reactor rocket systems, we again 
have a theoretical high performance potential. In these systems uranium 
is held in a gaseous state s o  that extremely high temperatures and high 
specific impulses may be achieved as hydrogen is heated by the fission 
process through various heat transfer processes. There are today no 
conceptual designs that can be considered practical. There a re  still 
very large gaps in basic understanding of the extremely high temperature 
processes that a r e  involved in this concept. Basic work on high 
temperature heat transfer and physics is, therefore, required and is 
being, at least, partially supported. It is my opinion that much of the 
basic work donefor this program can be considered to add to the fund 
of scientific knowledge that may one day find application in other areas 
and can be justified from that point alone. It is, however, important 
that concentrated thinking go into the developability of this system 
before major dollars a re  invested. There is no question that the 
extremely high temperatures involved make an accumulation of under- 
standing of the operating characteristics and the development of 
component parts of the system extremely difficult. One of the 
difficult features to simulate in the solid fuel element nuclear rocket 
reactor is the heat energy generated in this system. This problem will 
be increased many fold in any cavity o r  gaseous reactor system. Very 
sound thinking must, therefore, be directed toward evaluating the 
methods that can be used in the development of such a system and in 
, - .  
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understanding such a system for  the various potential concepts that 
have been considered. The basic question, "HOW do we test and develop?" 
must be one factored into the evaluation of feasibility of any concept 
proposed. I am afraid .that that has not been done sufficiently in 
many of the advanced areas that a re  being proposed. 
I have tried today to give a very frank assessment of where I 
think we stand in the area of propulsion for advanced missions. A l l  
of these systems rely on nuclear energy but not all of them have the 
same potential for use and development. I h o w  that my words will 
sound sour to some people. However, I believe that in meeting the 
challenge in this space age and in establishing our preeminence in this 
program, the country must carefully determine those areas that provide 
the greatest promise for assuring continued progress in our abilities 
to travel and explore in space. Within the practical considerations of 
budget and manpower an indiscriminate effort that puts equal weight 
on all things will result in no accomplishments. It is essential that 
just as we exercise discrimination in the space missions that we 
undertake, we must exercise discrimination and realism in the 
research and advanced technology development that we undertake. It 
is only through careful technical evaluation and assessment of all of 
the factors involved in the development of advanced systems that a 
sound, forward looking program of real accomplishment will result. 
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I urge that all of you also t ry  to  make this kind of an  assessment 
thoughtfilly and objectively. Our country will benefit from such 
objectivity. 
, 
